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THREE DIMENSIONS OF DIVORCE*
By
CIRCUIT JUDGE ROBERT W. HANSEN**
They tell the story of a divorce-minded husband consulting an attor-
ney in Milwaukee about starting an action for dissolution of the marriage.
"Well, we'd start with serving and filing a summons only," the lawyer
explained, "then sixty days must elapse before we can file a complaint,
and another sixty days before the action can be tried. There would be
a referral to the Family Conciliation Department to discuss recon-
ciliation. Because there are minor children involved, there would have
to be a preliminary hearing on temporary custody and child support
and the court might order a custody investigation which might take
an extra ninety days. If custody is in dispute, the judge would prob-
ably appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the minor and dependent
children and he might need some time to prepare for the trial . .
"Forget it," said the husband, "I can't stay mad that long."This incident may never have happened, but it certainly could have.
Not only is securing a decree of absolute divorce a more time-con-
suming proposition in Wisconsin than it is in almost any other state,
but there are more hurdles to get over between filing an action and
securing a judgment of divorce. This is not so much a matter of making
a divorce case an obstacle course as it is a matter of recognizing that
an action involving marriage and the family is not to be decided alone
by the wishes and desires of the two spouses. The public interest is
involved in every divorce action and the rights of minor children are
involved whenever the estranged couple have minor and dependent
issue of the marriage. In Wisconsin, in a divorce action, that public
interest must be taken into account always and the rights of minor
children must be considered and represented at the time of trial.
Adding the dimensions of concern for the public interest and the
rights of minor children in divorce actions was the principal change
effected by the enactment of the statewide Wisconsin Family Code' by
the 1959 session of the Wisconsin Legislature.2 Wisconsin became the
*Address at American Bar Association Section of Family Law, Montreal,
Canada. August 10, 1966.
** Senior Judge, Family Court of Milwaukee. Instructor in domestic relations,
National College of State Trial Judges (1964-65-66). Graduate, Marquette
University Law School. (1933) LL.B. magna cum laude. Editor, Marquette
Law Review (1932-33).
1 Wis. Stat. Ann. §§245.001, 248.08 (Supp. 1966).
2 Laws of Wis. 1959, ch. 595.
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first state and, until the New York State Legislature enacted its divorce
reform law in 1966,3 the only state to challenge on a statewide basis
the traditional concept that a divorce action involved no more than the
respective rights of two contending or agreeing spouses. Under the
Code the state and the minor children became concerned and affected
parties to the action even though not named as parties plaintiff or
defendant.
Lest there be any doubt about what they were doing and why they
were doing it, the Wisconsin legislators began their reconstruction and
recodification of the domestic relations laws of the state with this
declaration of intent: "It is the intent of chs. 245 to 248 to promote the
stability and best interests of marriage and the family. Marriage is the
institution that is the foundation of the family and of society. Its sta-
bility is basic to morality and civilization, and of vital interest to society
and the state. The consequences of the marriage contract are more
significant to society than those of other contracts, and the public inter-
est must be taken into account always. The seriousness of marriage
makes adequate premarital counseling and education for family living
highly desirable and courses thereon are urged upon all persons con-
templating marriage. The impairment or dissolution of the marriage
relation generally results in injury to the public wholly apart from the
effect upon the parties immediately concerned."4
THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM
This firm declaration of public policy, and the changes in procedural
and substantive law that accompanied it, challenged the idea that the
two people who entered the marriage contract are the only parties in-
volved in deciding whether the contract is to be dissolved. It was at
least one state's counter-attack against the widespread notion that a
divorce was to be granted almost always when one spouse requested it,
and without exception when both spouses agreed to it. Then, as now,
it was popular to attack the so-called "adversary system" of handling
family relations cases. The picture is painted of two hostile opponents,
donning the boxing gloves and entering the prize fight ring, ready to
do battle. Each has an attorney as a second or even as a substitute
gladiator. The judge is the referee and he is to raise the hand of one
or the other as the winner in the courtroom battle. The Wisconsin
Legislature recognized that this simply was not what was happening in
divorce cases in Wisconsin or anywhere else in the land.
Over ninety per cent of the divorce cases in the nation are default
or uncontested cases. The practice of divorce law in the United States
has become more at matter of "breaking down" contests than of trying
contested actions. Even in the less than ten per cent of the cases that
3N.Y. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 254.
4 V is. Stat. §245.001 (2) (1963).
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are contested, the disagreement is far more likely to be in the areas of
property division, alimony or custody placement of children than as to
the divorce itself. If the concept is accepted that only the two spouses
are involved in the action, once the two parties who agreed to get mar-
ried agree to get unmarried-who is left to disagree? The divorce-
seeking spouse or spouses get the divorce. The lawyer gets the fee. The
judge gets a case quickly and casually disposed of. Whatever you want
to call this practice of granting divorces by consent, the word "adver-
sary system" hardly describes it. In nine out of ten divorce cases in
the U.S.A., the courtroom "fight" is a fixed fight with the adversaries
waltzing to a prearranged decision. The judge may be raising the
hand of the wife or husband as the winner, but that decision was reach-
ed for him by the parties before they came to court. There isn't much
satisfaction in being the referee in a series of fixed fights where a one
round knockout has been arranged for in advance. This is the major
reason why so few trial judges have any enthusiasm for trying domestic
relations cases.
When someone observed that Christianity had been tried and found
too difficult, Gilbert Keith Chesterton responded that Christianity had
been found too easy and never tried at all. The adversary system in
divorce actions has been found so easy to circumvent that in nine out
of ten cases it isn't being used at all. "Do I have grounds for divorce ?"
the lady asked the lawyer. "Are you married ?" the lawyer asked the
lady. "Yes," answered the lady. "Then you have grounds for divorce,"
answered the lawyer. This not-too-funny story is made less humorous
by the fact that it describes the situation existing in most divorce
courts in this nation. At least where the wish of a spouse to end a mar-
riage is not contested by the marriage partner, divorces are granted
on the flimsiest of testimony in most courts. Except for the expenses
involved, where both parties agree, divorce in the United States has
become nearly as automatic as the "postcard divorces" once permitted
in the U.S.S.R. There are exceptions. There are many judges in the
United States who firmly reject this vending machine approach to
handling divorce and separation cases. But they are exceptions, not
the rule.
It is probable that it is this dichotomy between divorce in the books
based on serious misconduct or years of separate living and divorce
in practice based on consent of the parties that has led to recurrent
endeavors to remove family cases from the legal discipline and have
them handled by a panel of presumed experts from various fields. Pre-
sumably, such a panel would adjudge the "viability" of the marriage
or the "incompatibility" of the spouses. In theory, this would substitute
a finding of hopelessness of efforts to reconcile for a finding of legal
grounds for dissolving the marriage. In practice, this would likely do
1966]
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no more than legitimatize the granting of divorces based on consent,
for the most articulate advocates of taking divorces out of courts seem
not to be as concerned with promoting family stability as with making
divorces easier to secure. As is so often the case, the revolutionaries
are persuasive in pointing up weaknesses, but not so convincing in
establishing that they would do better or even as well. If the gates
have been lowered too far, it is hardly the answer to lower them even
more.
In any event, while it made the process of securing a divorce some-
what more difficult and certainly more time-involving, it is clear that
Wisconsin chose not to scuttle the adversary system but chose to insist
that the public interest and the rights of the children be represented
in the ring. The key provisions of the Wisconsin Family Code-the
"cooling-off periods," the effort to reconcile the parties in every case,
the protection of the rights of children and provision of legal repre-
sentation for the children, the starting of an action by service of a
summons only-are based on a recognition that society and the chil-
dren involved are adversely affected by divorce and best served by ef-
forts to seek reconciliations and to promote family stability.
IN THE BEGINNING
Many of the critics of the adversary approach to family law cases
are primarily concerned with the hostility-engendering manner in which
divorce actions are commenced. They are concerned with improving
the way in which divorce cases are brought to court, not with removing
family cases from the courts. Such constructive critics, including many
leaders of the bar and distinguished jurists, see the traditional manner
of commencing a divorce action as almost certain to lessen the chances
of harmonizing the difficulties that have brought the estranged couple
to court. Their primary target is the commencement of divorce proceed-
ings by the service of a summons and complaint upon the defendant,
the complaint including a detailed and usually imaginative listing of
the grievances of the divorce-seeking spouse. Where the plaintiff is
the wife, which happens to be the case in eight out of ten divorce ac-
tions, there is usually appended a petition or affidavit in support of a
request that the husband be ordered out of the family home forth-
with. This sworn statement of the dire consequences likely to attend
leaving the husband live at home is usually more detailed and more
imaginative than the complaint.
What this incendiary manner of starting divorce proceedings can
mean is demonstrated by a highly publicized divorce action in a south-
western state involving an astronaut. The husband and father of the
couple's four children was a scientist-astronaut selected from among
thousands for his intelligence, control of emotions, and stability. There
was trouble at home, and the wife started a divorce action. In her
[Vol. 50
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petition and pleadings she alleged that her husband was a man of "un-
governable outbursts of temper and passion." In addition, seeking an
ex parte court order ordering her husband out of the house, she signed
a petition stating that, unless the court order her husband to stay away
from their home, she would "suffer physical bodily injury and may
even lose her life." As would happen in over half of the divorce juris-
dictions in the nation, the judge entered a finding, without any hearing
of any kind, that the astronaut was indeed a man of ungovernable
temper and ordered him not to harm his wife or approach her resi-
dence. Every newspaper in the country carried the story of that tempo-
rary injunction. Subsequently, the action was dismissed by reason of
the reconciliation of the parties and the astronaut's being dropped from
the Space Program.
Is it possible to defend so inflammatory and reputation-destroying
a way of commencing a judicial inquiry into whether or not a divorce
is to be granted? Is this sort of thing at all necessary? The Wisconsin
legislature thought not and, with this situation even though not this
particular case in mind, made certain changes in the procedures by
which a divorce action in Wisconsin was to be started and brought to
trial. Since January, 1960, a divorce action in Wisconsin is begun by
serving upon the defendant, if he is within the state, a summons only.5
Sixty days must elapse before a complaint can be served and filed.6
Even then the complaint may state only the statutory ground upon
which a divorce is sought without detailing allegations which constitute
the basis for such ground.7 (The facts relied upon as the statutory
ground for the action shall be furnished upon demand in a verified
bill of particulars.8 ) By court rule in most counties, if not all, any
affidavit in support of a motion for temporary alimony, child support,
custody and visitation, etc., may not include the accusatory allegations
specifically banned from the complaint.
If the astronaut's wife's suit had been brought in any Wisconsin
court, it would have started with the service of a summons only, which
doesn't give the news media too much too work with. The grounds
upon which the divorce was being sought would not have been known
until the complaint was filed, sixty days later. Even then no more than
the statutory ground would have been stated. If pendente lite orders
were sought in relation to the living arrangements of the couple while
the action was pending, the supporting affidavit would contain no
character-defaming allegations or accusations. Certainly the Wisconsin
procedure is less of a pressure cooker, less likely to inflict wounds that
never completely heal. While it is true that the case of the astronaut
5 Wis. Stat. Ann. §247.061 (1) (Supp. 1966).6 Ibid.
7 Wis. Stat. §247.085(2) (1%3).
8 Ibid.
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resulted in a reconciliation, no credit goes to the procedure followed
and unnecessary harm and humiliation was caused.
What Wisconsin has done is to soften and delay the operation of
the adversary system in the crucial early days of a divorce action. The
commencement of the action by service of a summons only is at least
a less harsh and antagonistic beginning than the service of a summons
and complaint. The sixty-day waiting period gives the plaintiff two
months to decide whether or not the next step is to be taken. The delay
before complaint can be served gives the defendant time to decide
whether to respond in kind with a counterclaim. The bland complaint
required, with no itemization of allegations as to misconduct, leaves
unspoken, at least to the time of trial (unless a bill of particulars is
demanded), the charges that are so easy to make and so hard to with-
draw.
It is interesting to note that during the first six years of operating
under the Family Code, in the Family Court of Milwaukee County,
forty-seven out of every one hundred divorce actions commenced were
dropped before trial by reason of the reconcilation of the parties or
failure to proceed. It is even more interesting to note that two out of
three of such dismissals before trial were actions in which a summons
had been served but in which no complaint was ever filed. For example,
of the 1178 dismissals during 1965, 760 were cases in which a sum-
mons was filed, the action started but no complaint ever filed. In addi-
tion, during 1965 there were 106 cases in which a summons was served
upon the defendant and the Family Court Commissioner but the action
never filed in court. Of course, not all such dismissals represented
full and complete reconciliations, and, of course, not all reconciliations
last. In medical circles that is known as the factor of reoccurrence. It
would seem more than likely that the improvements in the manner of
commencing divorce actions-the summons only, the sixty-day interval
between summons and complaint, the ban on itemized allegations of
misconduct in the complaint-were helpful factors in keeping high
the percentage of cases never brought to trial. Equally helpful, how-
ever, must have been the time and counselling requirements of the
Code.
TIME AND COUNSELLING
The two most basic changes effected by the Wisconsin Family Code
were: 1) the requirement that there be two sixty-day "cooling off"
periods between the starting of a divorce action and its trial;9 and
2), the requirement that an effort to reconcile the parties be made in
every case. 10 These corollary requirements not only challenged the
traditional legal-only approach which viewed the social consequences
9 Wis. Stat. Ann. §247.081 (2) (Supp. 1966).
10 Id. at (1).
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of divorce as irrelevant, but went beyond the conciliation court con-
cept which had led to establishing court-related conciliation services
in various jurisdictions. What the traditionalist did not want to do at
all and what the conciliation court advocate wanted to do in selected
cases only was under the Wisconsin plan to be attempted in every case.
Wisconsin, which had pioneered in establishing a socio-legal approach
to family cases through court conciliation services on a voluntary
basis, now led the way in requiring both a Mlow-down and an effort to
reconcile in every case.
While practice lagged behind preachments, it is clear that "during
the last thirty years there has been increasing recognition that courts
have the opportunity, if not the duty, to render affirmative and con-
structive assistance to families in difficulty."" For the most part, this
recognition has taken the form of agitation for and establishment of
conciliation court services, almost entirely in large metropolitan com-
munities, directly connected to and operating in connection with di-
vorce or domestic relations courts. The common denominator of such
court-related conciliation service is that the attempt to reconcile the
parties is limited to couples who desire assistance with their problems
or at least exhibit some motivation toward reconciliation. The best and
most complete analysis of the conciliation court concept is made in an
article by Prof. Henry Foster of New York University, a national
authority on family law.' 2 Prof. Foster summarizes the strengths and
shortcomings of the conciliation courts in action, and compares it
with the socio-legal approach to all cases set up in the Wisconsin Family
Code. In a nutshell, the strength is that efforts are concentrated on the
cases where counselling has the best chance of success, while the weak-
ness is that it fails to reach most divorce cases filed in court.
It is interesting that Wisconsin went to the statewide socio-legal
approach in all cases after twenty-five years of experience with the
conciliation court approach. In the year 1935, the Wisconsin legislature
authorized the establishment of the Family Court of Milwaukee with
a Family Conciliation Department, then termed the Domestic Concilia-
tion Department. 13 For twenty-five years, until the enactment of the
Code, this court and this department operated under the conciliation
court concept, with selected cases referred to the conciliators by the
judge, by the attorneys, or by the parties themselves. So Milwaukee is
the only community in the United States that has had experience with
the three major systems being used or proposed; the traditional legal
only concept up until 1935; the conciliation court service concept from
1935 to 1960; the socio-legal family court since 1960.
1 Foster, Conciliation and Counseling in the Courts in Family Law Cases, 41
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353 (1966).12 Ibid.
'3 Laws of Wis. 1935, ch. 213. Wis. Stat. Ann. §252.016 (Supp. 1966).
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It is not easy to compare the three approaches or concepts as they
were used in Milwaukee. The passing years seem to blur, not sharpen,
the recollections of those who practiced as attorneys or served as judges
under all three approaches. Probably nothing can be added to Prof.
Foster's summarization that under the legal only system the courts did
little or nothing to effect reconciliations; that under the conciliation
court service plan the court agencies often effect reconciliations in that
percentage of cases in which reconciliations seemed likely; that under
the socio-logical approach more reconciliations are or can be effected
although the batting average of successes is bound to be lower. It is
worth noting that during the last five years under the conciliation court
policy of selected referrals, 37% of divorce cases filed in Milwaukee
County Circuit Court were dropped before trial. During the first six
years of operating under the conciliation referrals in every case pursu-
ant to the Code, the percentage of cases dismissed before trial rose to
47%. However, the required referral is not the only factor involved,
and accounts only for some of the improved showing.
The arguments for an effort being made to reconcile the parties
in every case line in other directions. To begin with, it is consistent
with the public interest in promoting reconciliations wherever possible.
What is involved is not so much an effort to conciliate in every case
as an insistence upon a diagnostic or screening interview in every case
to discuss the problems that have brought the parties to court. Even
if a divorce proves to be unavoidable, such interview helps develop
self-insight on the part of the spouses, directs attention to the impact
of divorce on their children, indicates an interest and concern of the
court in the litigants as individuals instead of as case numbers. To
have the litigants decide for themselves whether they are to talk matters
over with a trained marriage counsellor often will mean that the parties,
either or both, will view a willingness to discuss reconciliation as a
sign of weakness or matter of losing face. It can be definitely stated
that many of the reconciliations effected in the Family Court of Mil-
waukee involved couples who initially were certain that any reconcili-
ation was out of the question. You can't always tell a book by the cover.
The most violently upset and bitterly estranged come back to court
later on, arm in arm. "We decided to put up with our incompatibilities,"
one such once-warring couple cheerfully reported.
RIGHTS OF CHILDREN
One dramatic result of the enactment of the Family Code has been
the upgrading of the status of children in divorce cases. Where the
traditional view prevails that a divorce action involves no more than
the rights (or wishes and desires) of the two spouses, the minor chil-
dren of the divorce-seekers become hardly more than products of the
marriage to be divided or dealt with in terms of the rights of their
[Vol. 50
THREE DIMENSIONS OF DIVORCE
parents. Particularly where there is no dispute between the spouses as
to custody arrangements or child support, it is what the parties suggest
to the court that is routinely incorporated in the judgment. Actually,
it is expected that the stipulation or advance agreement of the parties
is to include, not only what is to happen to the house, bank accounts,
furniture, and family automobile, but also what is to be done with or
about the children.
Even in those jurisdictions where divorces by consent are granted
without much fuss or feathers, the judges involved would protest that
acceptance of the recommendations of the litigants does not reduce the
children to mere chattels or possessions of the parties to be disposed
of along with the hi-fi set. Trial courts do base their decisions, where
the parties cannot agree, on what is uniformly termed "concern for the
welfare" of the children. Where there is an actual contest as to custody
placement, visitation privileges, or support payments, the polestar is
concern for the welfare of the child. But since in most cases there is
an agreement in advance of trial as to provisions of the judgment
affecting the children and since most trial courts quickly, almost casual-
ly, dispose of uncontested cases, it is hard to escape the conclusion that
it is the wishes of the parents that in fact control. Since such advance
agreements so often are a matter of bargaining, jockeying for advant-
age, and making compromises to facilitate the securing of an uncon-
tested divorce decree, it is equally hard to escape the even more fright-
ening conclusions that the children are no more than pawns in a chess
game played by their parents and their counsel.
In this field of what is the exact status and what are the rights of
the children of litigants in a divorce action, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court implemented the obvious intent of the legislature and spelled out
the affirmative steps that a trial judge in Wisconsin must take to de-
termine and to protect and to provide legal representation for the rights
of the minor children of the parties. Two decisions stand out as land-
marks in the post-Code appellate court decisions relating to the rights
and welfare of such victims of marital break ups.
In the first, the Kritzik case,14 the Supreme Court clearly set forth
the approach that state trial courts are to take toward matters affecting
the children of divorcing parents, stating, "In making his determina-
tions as to what conditions of a divorce judgment would best serve
the interests of the children involved, the trial court does not function
solely as an arbiter between two private parties. Rather, in his role
as a family court, the trial court represents the interests of society in
promoting the stability and best interests of the family. It is his task to
determine what provisions and terms would best guarantee an oppor-
tunity for the children involved to grow to mature and responsible
'4 Kritzik v. Kritzik, 21 Wis. 2d 442, 124 N.W. 2d 581 (1963).
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citizens, regardless of the desires of the respective parties. This power,
vested in the family court, reflects a recognition that children involved
in a divorce are always disadvantaged parties and that the law must
take affirmative steps to protect their welfare."'15
If there ever was any doubt about it, the Wisconsin high court
clearly gave its approval to the family court judge conducting an inde-
pendent investigation to determine the needs and to evaluate the alter-
natives as to custody placement. The court stated, "The trial court may,
on his own initiative, gather information on the question of whether a
proposed change enhances the welfare of the children. This informa-
tion may be in addition to the evidence produced by either party as to
whether the proposed modification will serve the best interests of the
children. Thus, the trial court is not a passive agent bound by the in-
formation supplied by the parties on this issue. When a trial court
does exercise his initiative and does obtain information on which he
wishes to rely in reaching a determination concerning the best interests
of the children, he should not act on such information until he has in-
formed the parties about the information and given each party an op-
portunity to be heard and to make a record opposing or amplifying
such information."'16
In a more recent decision,'17 the state's highest court dealt with the
matter of legal representation for the children in their role as con-
cerned and affected parties to the action pending between their parents.
At least in the Family Court of Milwaukee, judges in the family
division, relying upon the inherent power of the court to protect the
rights of the children, had been appointing attorneys as guardians ad
litern for the children in cases where custody was in dispute or where
there was reason for grave concern as to the wellbeing of the children.
In the Wendland case, the Supreme Court endorsed the idea of appoint-
ing guardians ad litem for the children in sharply contested cases and
went further to require that a legal representative, either the Family
Court Commissioner or a special guardian ad litem, be present at the
time of trial to speak up for the rights and welfare of the minor chil-
dren. The court ruled, "In an uncontested divorce the family court
commissioner will make a recommendation on the question of custody.
Where there is a hotly contested custody dispute, and the court is satis-
fied that the procedures of relying on the two parties and the investi-
gation of a welfare agency may not produce all the important evidence
that the court should consider in looking after the best interests of the
children, a guardian ad litein should be appointed. Inevitably this will
add to the expense of the divorce proceedings. But such expense will
be rewarding if the interests of the children are better served. This
15 Id. at 448, 124 N.W. 2d at 585.16 Id. at 449, 124 N.W. 2d at 585-86.
17 Wendland v. Wendland, 29 Wis. 2d 145, 138 N.W. 2d 185 (1965).
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extra consideration is due the children who are not to be buffeted around
as mere chattels in a divorce controversy, but rather are to be treated
as interested and affected parties whose welfare should be the prime
concern of the court in its custody determinations."',8
As a guideline to attorneys who serve as guardians ad litem for
children in divorce actions, as well as to the trial judges who appoint
them, the court, in this case, commented, "If a guardian ad litem is
appointed by the court, he should be allowed adequate opportunity to
make such further investigation as he deems advisable after becoming
familiar with the record herein; if he should request the taking of testi-
mony of additional witnesses he should be granted the privilege of
calling such witnesses."'19 In actual practice, the attorney appointed by
the court to represent the children participates in the trial with the
same right to call witnesses, cross-examine witnesses, and argue to the
court as accorded counsel for the wife or husband. An initial fear that
there might be duplication or conflict in the respective roles of the
court-appointed social investigator and court-appointed legal repre-
sentative has proved groundless. Particularly where the social investi-
gator is recommending a custody ruling favored by neither of the
parents, the guardian serves as a friend in court for the investigator
as well as a lawyer in fact for the best interests of the children.
Read together, these two decisions clarify the right and imply the
responsibility of a trial judge to do two things: 1) direct that an in-
vestigtion be made by a court-appointed social investigator whenever
there is reason for concern as to the welfare of the children involved
in a divorce action; and 2), provide a legal representative, either the
family court commissioner or a guardian ad litem, to represent the
rights and protect the interests of the children at the time of trial. No
one can say that these two affirmative steps to protect the welfare of
children save them from the shattering impact of the family coming
apart at the seams. No one would claim that these two steps are all
that could or should be done to lessen the disadvantage that comes to
the "half-orphans" created by divorce. They are, however, a beginning
and a dimension-expanding recognition that children are concerned and
affected parties to the divorce action of their parents.
The most heart-warming experience that this writer has had in
over a decade of judicial work has been to see the zeal and dedication
with which both social workers and attorneys have responded to this
interdisciplinary approach to helping children of divorce. The court-
appointed social investigators, often including workers in private
agencies, psychiatrists, and educators, bring in reports and recommend-
ations that reflect countless hours of checking, interviewing, investi-
18 Id. at 156-57, 138 N.W. 2d at 191.
'9 Id. at 157, 138 N.W. 2d at 191.
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gating and evaluating. The court-appointed guardians ad litem, some
young attorneys and many older practitioners, give time and energy to
the assignment of representing the minor children far beyond what
the court had a right to expect. Since the only fee that can be ordered
paid out is out of the costs of the action, the lawyer for the children
in some cases is not paid at all for his services. Instead of the grumbling
or grousing that one might expect and excuse, there has been a measur-
ing up to the highest standards of the profession. There have been
scores of cases where guardians ad litem have driven hundreds of
miles to talk with grandparents on a farm to be able to compare all
available alternatives as to custody placement. There have been cases
where, long after the judgment has been entered, a guardian moved to
reopen the custody order because of a deterioration in the home en-
vironment that he had once considered adequate. There has been no
case in which the children's lawyer has treated lightly or casually his
responsibility to be their friend in court. Those who despair of ef-
fective interdisciplinary cooperation ought to come to Milwaukee's
family court to see this partnership of social investigators-legal guard-
ians in action.
FAMILY COURT COMMISSIONERS
The emphasis in this article on separation of summons and com-
plaint, elimination of detailed allegations in the complaint, protection
of rights of children, and the requirements as to the time and counsel-
ling should not be interpreted as meaning that these were the only
changes made. A variety of provisions, some unique or nearly so among
the states of the nation, were enacted into law. These included giving
the judge the right to grant either a limited or absolute divorce, re-
gardless of the prayer of the complaint based on the best interests of
the children ;20 requiring court permission to remarry where a parent
is under court order to support children of a previous marriage ;21
granting the court authority to make orders in the field of child sup-
port even where a divorce is denied.2 2 The temptation to discuss all
of the changes made must be resisted.
However, one all-important aspect of the Family Code is not to
be ignored: the duties and responsibilities of the Family Court Com-
missioner. The key to the success of the Code in any Wisconsin county
is the Family Court Commissioner. To read the Wisconsin Family
Code is to realize that a major share of the responsibility for: 1.), see-
ing that an attempt to reconcile the parties is made; 2.), protecting the
rights of children and enforcing child support orders; and 3.), repre-
senting the public interest and public policy at the trial of divorce ac-
tions-is placed upon the shoulders of the Family Court Commissioner.
20 Wis. Stat §247.09 (1963).
21 Wis. Stat. Ann. §245.10 (Supp. 1966).
22 Wis. Stat. §247.28 (1963).
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It is not too much to say that, unless the Family Court Commissioner
tackles his many assignments with dedication, determination and en-
thusiasm, the expectations of the Code drafters are not likely to be
realized. This is particularly true because, as often happens in any
new endeavor, people are quick to delegate responsibilities and slow to
provide adequate remuneration, adequate staff, and adequate support
to get the jobs assigned done. The most successful Family Courts in
Wisconsin are those in which the judges were fortunate in securing a
dedicated Family Court Commissioner who was determined to meet the
challenge and responsibilities of the position.
There is a Family Court Commissioner, sometimes with an as-
sistant, in every county in the state. He is a practicing attorney, selected
by the circuit and county judges in and for such county, a "reputable
attorney of recognized ability and standing at the bar."23 In Milwaukee
County there are five full-time family court commissioners, appointed
and serving under the civil service system. All pleadings and motions
in a divorce action must be served upon the family court commissioner.
In every action for divorce or legal separation, the family court com-
missioner shall cause an effort to be made to effect a reconciliation
between the parties. This shall be done either by his own efforts and
the efforts of a family court conciliation department if it exists, or by
referring such parties and having them voluntarily consult the director
of the local public welfare department, the county mental health or guid-
ance clinic, a clergyman, or the child welfare agency.24 While this in
practice is usually a referral proposition, the attitude of the family
court commissioner and the rapport established at the initial interview
is an important predisposing factor in the whole process of reconcilia-
tion. In addition, the Code provides that no judgment in any action
for divorce in which the commissioner is required to appear may be
granted until such commissioner in behalf of the public has made a
fair and impartial investigation of the case and advised the court, not
only as to such investigation, but as to reconciliation attempts having
been made.28 The commissioner is entitled to subpoena witnesses, par-
ticipate in the trial, and make a statement to the court as the repre-
sentative of the public interest.26
The Family Court in Wisconsin is a partnership of two disciplines
-the legal and the therapeutic. In deciding the cause of action and
dividing the property of the parties, it is a court of legal procedures.
In seeking to reconcile the parties and protect the rights of children,
it is a court of therapy, seeking to utilize modern marriage counsel-
ling and social service techniques. Any such partnership rests upon
23 Wis. Stat. §247.13 (1963).24 Wis. Stat. Ann. §247.081 (Supp. 1966).25 Wis. Stat. Ann. §247.15 (Supp. 1966).
26 Wis. Stat. §247.14 (1963), Wis. Stat. Ann. §247.15 (Supp. 1966).
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clear allocation of roles, clear understanding of responsibilities, and
shared determination to make the partnership work. It is the not al-
ways easy responsibility of the Family Court Commissioner to be the
linchpin between the legal and therapeutic phases of family court
operations in Wisconsin. He must do several jobs and do them well-
and that is no easy assignment.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
It is too early to bring in a final verdict on the success of the Wis-
consin Family Code. In fact, any such law is no finished product.
Changes are made at each session of the state legislature. At the 1966
session the state lawmakers granted to family court judges the right
to order wage assignments to be made by non-custodian parents to in-
sure payment of child support grants and provided that a non-custodian
mother could be ordered to contribute to the support of children not in
her custody.27 It is too early to predict whether the Wisconsin approach
will remain an isolated experiment or become a pattern for similar
statewide family codes in other states. The recent adoption in New
"ork State of a new Divorce Reform Law that contains many features
of the Wisconsin law28 may be the start of a trend. For the present,
it at least can be concluded that some improvements have been made,
some progress achieved, and some interesting questions raised by six
years of operation of the Wisconsin Family Code.
When Gertrude Stein lay on her deathbed, she is said to have asked
her companion for many years, Alice Toklas, "Well, Alice, what is
the answer?" Her friend for a near lifetime answered, "Gertrude, we
do not know the answer." "Well, then, Alice," countered Gertrude
Stein, "What is the question?" We do not know and far from agree
to the answers in this whole field of family law. But, at least in Wis-
consin, people are recognizing and struggling with the questions of
policy and procedure presented, including:
How can we more effectively promote family stability by help-
ing divorce-bound couples reconcile their differences?
How can we more effectively protect the rights and welfare of
the children involved in family cases?
How can we expand the dimensions of a divorce case to include
concern of the interests and well-being of spouses, their children
and the public?
27 Wis. Stat. Ann. §§247.235, .265 (Supp. 1966).
28Parallel provisions of the New York Divorce Reform Law and the Wisconsin
Family Code include the following: (1). commencement of divorce actions
by service of a summons only; (2). requirement of 120 days waiting period
between commencement of action and trial of action; (3). appointment of
qualified attorney to serve as representative of public interest and to insure
that reconciliation efforts are made; (4). requirement of an effort to reconcile
the parties in all cases; (5). authorization (by statute in New York State; by
court decision in Wisconsin) of appointment of legal guardian to represent
rights of children in divorce cases. The Wisconsin and New York laws seek a
statewide approach to handling family cases in court as opposed to authorizing
special courts and approaches on a big city or county option basis.
[Vol. 50
